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to long terms of imprisonment in any event—it may be quite some
time before this fiscal pressure makes political change a reality.
Despite its seemingly narrow focus on a single punishment, one
imposed on only 41,000 of the more than 2 million people in
prisons and jails in this country, this book is an important read for
anyone interested in understanding contemporary American
penology. The authors’ analysis of LWOP sentences—their history,
their ties to other punishments, the hopes for the future—tells
us much about the uniquely American approach to crime and
punishment.
  
Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in
Dialogue. Edited by Brian Z. Tamanaha, Caroline Sage, and
Michael Woolcock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
270 pp. $ 99.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Ralf Michaels, Duke University
This collection of essays (some of them previously published in the
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law) emerges from a 2010 workshop
organized by the “Justice for the Poor” initiative in the World Bank.
The book, like the workshop, brings together scholars and practi-
tioners (a dichotomy curiously maintained even in the list of con-
tributors). The hope, expressed in the excellent introduction by
Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock (a version of which had been
circulated to the conference participants in preparation) was to
initiate a dialogue to instill better mutual knowledge.
Indeed, some contributions to the book suggest that the classic
definition of legal pluralism as the coexistence of plural laws in the
same social space, and the ensuing discussion in scholarship, are
still not yet universally known. Daniel Adler and Sokbunthoeun So,
in their paper, confine “law” to state law and discuss how state law
is sometimes not effective. David Kinley discusses, as pluralism,
varieties of human rights law between states, but not interaction
with non-state law. Varun Gauri does adopt the classical definition,
but his list of shortcomings of non-state law—substantive defects,
lack of enforcement power, lack of publicity—still uses an idealized
vision of state law as the yardstick.
Appropriately, several other chapters are conceived largely as
brief introductions into legal pluralism made for non-experts.
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William Twining even calls his chapter “Legal Pluralism 101” and
provides a highly sophisticated analytical survey. Sally Merry gives
a very lucid and succinct introduction to legal pluralism, legal
culture, legal consciousness and legal mobilization, from the lens of
anthropology, and links this with the concrete example of women’s
courts in Gujarat. Lauren Benton presents the historical link
between pluralism and Empire/colonialism. Brian Tamanaha
and, somewhat more systematically, Gordon Woodman, link more
explicitly the two topics of the book and invite development prac-
titioners both to take pluralism more seriously as a concept and to
view it with less suspicion as a phenomenon. Julio Faundez shows
how such rather theoretical considerations play out in a wide
variety of contexts. Christian Lund points out that institutional
pluralism exists also between state institutions, and shows this in the
example of property rights in Niger. Meg Taylor and Nicholas
Menzies apply academic insights faithfully (perhaps too much so) to
the example of mining.
Fortunately, most authors reject the simple question whether
legal pluralism is a problem or an opportunity, and respond either
with “yes and no” or assert that legal pluralism represents simply
the background conditions against which development agencies
operate (thus Patrick Glenn). Deborah Isser even considers the
question itself irrelevant: she suggests that what matters is not legal
pluralism as such but instead how to work best with the existing
realities of state and non-state norms. The two most interesting
contributions make more constructive use of the concept. Kanishka
Jayasuriya suggests that state and non-state institutions should not
be viewed as alternatives but rather as coming together to form
a hybrid. Instead of hoping for non-state institutions to replace
the state, he suggests seeing legal pluralism itself as a regulatory
project. Doug J. Porter demonstrates how much the phenomenon
of legal pluralism has always been familiar to development agen-
cies, and then lists a number of challenges that this pluralism poses
for traditional state-focused development initiatives.
Such chapters make it clear that the dialogue which the book
aims for will have a long way to go in both directions. Some devel-
opment initiatives may indeed still be too focused on the state as
regulator, despite the long existing critique by legal scholars (a
literature that is, unfortunately, rarely referenced in this book). But
the book makes it clear also that legal pluralists will need to update
their understanding of development initiatives, which, as several
contributions by “practitioners” make clear, have a far more sophis-
ticated understanding of the interactions of state law and non-state
norms than they are given credit for.
In the end, the initiated debate between practitioners and
scholars suggests that legal pluralism may be of limited use for
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practitioners, for two reasons. First, the instrumentalist and
reformist ambition of development initiatives is only partly com-
patible with the descriptive and often conservatory attitude of pro-
ponents of legal pluralism. Even if development and pluralism
know more of each other, they may therefore not lose their mutual
suspicion. Second, legal pluralism, as a general theory, may be of
only limited use to development agencies. They know about nor-
mative pluralism from their work, and whether these plural norms
are law or not matters little to them. The book is most instructive
where it goes beyond generalizations and presents concrete
examples—and here, it turns out that the practitioners sometimes
have more to teach than the scholars.
  
Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law: Holding Agents
of Atrocity Accountable to the World. By Kirsten J. Fisher. London:
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Reviewed by Shannon Brincat, School of Political Science and
International Studies, University of Queensland
This timely volume makes a significant contribution to exploring
the normative dimensions of International Criminal Law (ICL), a
subfield that has been underexplored and clearly outpaced by the
quantity of works in (positive) ICL. Fisher makes a worthy entry
into these debates, one free of legalistic jargon, and this book
will serve as a foundational text in this subject-area for students
in the years to come. The book makes a number of important
contributions, including developing threshold criteria to define
international crime and substantiating a framework of justice
for international criminal prosecution and punishment based on
retributive and expressive models.
Fisher aims to examine “how responsible agents, individuals
and the collectives they comprise, ought to be held accountable to
the world for the commission of atrocity.” The volume evaluates
international prosecution as the “right” response to a range of
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes
and genocide (p. 3). More specifically, the book attempts to define
the proper domain of ICL and its ambit regarding international
crime. To this end, Fisher constructs a useful typology of interna-
tional crimes and offers a normative engagement with the question
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